Saturday, April 28, 2007

Turkey's Army Raises The Stakes With The Islamists

Turkey's army is sending very public signals to the government that it may act to protect Turkey's system of secular government if the AKP party elects the Islamist Abdullah Gul as President. This from the ETB24 News Service:

Turkey's Islamist-rooted government condemned on Saturday an army threat to intervene in the nation's presidential contest while the EU and the United States urged a peaceful resolution of the crisis.

The army, which has ousted four governments in the past 50 years, issued a toughly worded statement on Friday expressing concern over the election and said it was ready to act in defence of the secular system separating state and religion.

Government spokesman Cemil Cicek's attack on the army marked an escalation in an election row pitting Turkey's secular elite, including the powerful army generals, against a government they accuse of trying to increase the role of Islam in politics.

. . . The secularists believe the ruling AK Party's presidential candidate, Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul, a former Islamist, would chip away at the secular state if elected. As president he would be commander in chief of the armed forces.

Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan spoke on Saturday by telephone with Turkey's top general, Yasar Buyukanit, Cicek said, adding the military must stay under strict civilian control.

Cicek said the army statement was aimed against the government and was timed to influence the Constitutional Court which is set to study a legal challenge to Friday's inconclusive first round of the presidential election.

. . . The European Union, which Turkey hopes to join, and Ankara's NATO ally the United States urged respect for democracy. "This is a test case if the Turkish armed forces respect democratic secularism and the democratic arrangement of civil-military relations," EU enlargement chief Olli Rehn told reporters in Brussels.

. . . Karl Duckworth, U.S. State Department spokesman in Washington, said: "The United States fully supports the constitutional process of Turkey's secular democracy. The Constitutional Court will have to decide on any questions regarding Turkey's presidential elections..."

Friday's army statement followed Gul's failure to win enough votes in parliament in the first round of the presidential election. A second vote is set for next Wednesday.

Secularist opposition parties boycotted Friday's session. One of them has asked the Constitutional Court to annul Friday's vote because there were fewer than two thirds of deputies in the chamber at the time. The government says the vote was valid.

If the court upholds the opposition appeal next week, Erdogan would have to call a snap election. President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, a staunch secularist, would stay in office until a new parliament could elect his successor.

. . . Ten years ago, Turkey's army ousted Islamist premier Necmettin Erbakan's government, in which Gul also served, with strong public backing and without tanks on the streets.

Few are predicting another military coup in Turkey, where economic growth is robust and Erdogan's government popular, but the army statement has raised the stakes in the battle of wills. Analysts say an early general election may be the only way to defuse the tensions and allow the country to move forward.
Read the entire article here. I am unsure how to feel about the EU's warning. On one hand, it is comic for being utterly meaningless. There is no military threat behind it, and it is pretty clear that the EU will not forgo a single euro in trade over it. On the other hand, it is rather ironic for being issued in protection of Islamists. If Gates of Vienna's compelling arguments on Islamicization in Europe and its likely course are accurate, this continued EU willingness to do business with and support Islamists may be biting them sooner rather then later.

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Friday, April 27, 2007

Shooting Dionnes In A Barrel

The left's motivation to retreat from Iraq is now so nakedly partisan and political that it can't be covered up. But that will not sway partisan hacks from trying to claim otherwise as they fight to keep middle America from waking up to the changing reality in Iraq and the potential costs to the nation if Reid and company succeed in forcing defeat and retreat. For example, see this today from EJ Dionne which, if it did not appear in the Opinion section of a major newspaper, I would consider an attempt at satire:

President Bush and Vice President Cheney cannot make the case that their Iraq policies have succeeded, so they are doing one thing they do very well: taking a serious argument over the future of American foreign policy and turning it into a petty partisan squabble.

This is not really an argument over the "surge" of troops into Iraq. It is a fight over whether we want to make an open-ended commitment to keeping combat forces in Iraq for many years or whether we anticipate pulling most of them out within a year or two.
Way to stay on message, E.J. The surge is meaningless. We don’t want any reports of improving conditions in Iraq to confuse the decision. I like how you seperate the surge from the issue of declaring defeat in advance and getting out of Iraq. And Bush is the partisan acting for wholly political reasons. I love the way you turn a Dem weakness around by accusing the other side of the failing. Great tactics, EJ.

Even if the surge succeeds in a narrow sense -- by reducing the number of Iraqis killed in sectarian violence in Baghdad -- there is no guarantee that the overall situation in Iraq will be any better, no guarantee that Iraqi leaders will take the political steps necessary to end the internecine killing and create a stable government, no guarantee that we will make progress against al-Qaeda.
Good, EJ. We need to stay away from the original reason to get out of Iraq – that there was a “civil war” going on. Can’t have a civil war without sectarian violence now, can we. Thank God the surge is so narrow in its scope and that it can’t guarantee outcomes. Why the hell did we get into all this anyway if al Qaeda and Iran had not agreed to surrender and make it easy for us in the first place.

Although he conveniently appeared in Washington as Congress was voting on war appropriations, Gen. David Petraeus, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, did not play politics.
I like the way you frame this one. Bringing the top general in Iraq, the one leading the effort to stabilize the country, to Washington, for an unwanted briefing on the facts directly in advance of voting on retreat was clearly a partisan political move by the Bushies. And just to attend that briefing, Nancy had to cancel a visit with the art dealer where whe was getting the photos of her talking to Syria's president framed. Ooops - sorry - I forgot, she didn't attend the Petraeus briefing.

Wednesday in assessing the situation there. He spoke, rightly, of progress in Anbar province, a Sunni stronghold, but added: "The ability of al-Qaeda to conduct horrific, sensational attacks obviously has represented a setback and is an area in which we are focusing considerable attention."
See. The Surge is not working. Just because the Sunnis in Anbar (hey, aren’t they the one’s supposed to be fighting the other half of the civil war?) are joining government security forces in droves and are moving al Qaeda out of their Anbar bases is meaningless so long as 1 or 2 suicide bombers from Saudi Arabia can blow themselves up. A good I told you so moment, EJ.

The president's comments this week were less measured. "I will strongly reject an artificial timetable withdrawal," Bush said, "and/or Washington politicians trying to tell those who wear the uniform how to do their job."

Let's parse that statement. The notion that Congress has an "artificial timetable" suggests there must be such a thing as a "natural timetable." But what would that be? Presumably, the president would reply: when we achieve victory. But what is the definition of "victory" in the murky mess we're in? The administration offers only generalities that lead us nowhere.
EJ, you might want to stay away from this one. Its too easy to point out that the natural timetable would be when Iraq and its government are stabilized and can stand on their own. That is, after all, kind of how we left Germany and Japan. Work on that one.

And it's beyond chutzpah for a politician who has lived at 1600 Pennsylvania Ave. for more than 2,280 days to attack "Washington politicians." Didn't Petraeus get his orders to pursue the surge from a certain Washington politician otherwise known as the commander in chief?
EJ, this one is pretty weak too. Can you tighten this one up. Bush is criticizing Reed, Pelosi et al for making military decisions that aren’t theirs to make under the Constitution. We don’t want to raise that or the Dems will have to take responsibility for those decisions. Let’s stick to the simple arguments, okay, before we start confusing the issues with facts.

Or take Vice President Cheney's statement on Tuesday: "Some Democratic leaders seem to believe that blind opposition to the new strategy in Iraq is good politics." Cheney assumes that opposition to the administration's policies must be "blind" rather than a considered, rational response to four years of failure. And the opposition must be rooted in "politics" and not in principle, presumably because reasonable people cannot possibly have good cause for disagreeing with the administration.
I love how you do this, EJ. Cheney is acting only for partisan political gain while Reid is the politician acting only on principal. I like how you focus on the pre-surge days and how you sidestep the fact that Reid said he would not believe any change in facts on the ground. No need to dwell on that when we can dwell on the pre-surge days.

What Bush and Cheney are doing is not just wrong. It's dangerous. If they were interested in success in Iraq, they would have turned down the partisan rhetoric long ago.
This is absolutely fantastic. You have made Bush and Cheney out to be the dangers to our national security, and taken the focus off the ramifications for our national security if we retreat. Be careful with the non-sequiturs though. We need to appeal to middle America, not just George Soros.

A substantial majority now opposes their policies. The last thing the administration needs is more polarization, which clearly has not worked in its favor.
That’s better. These republicans should treat war and our national security like good dems – a lot less principle, a lot more polling.

The president needs to convince Americans that a decent result in Iraq is still possible. . . .
EJ and I agree on that one. Wholeheartedly.

With the president set to veto the supplemental spending bill that includes calls for withdrawal, the whole burden of proof in this debate should change.
Good, EJ. We do not want some idiot reporters asking our boys questions about what will happen as a result of a retreat and surrender – at least not before the 08 election is over. Way to keep this debate focused on what matters. Only ask questions and expect reasonable answers from the Republicans. Great stuff.

The burden should no longer be on those who say we are reaching the limits of what military force can achieve in Iraq -- partly because we never sent enough troops in the first place and also because our military is stretched to the breaking point, limiting how many forces the Washington politician in the White House can offer Petraeus.
Watch this kind of argument, EJ. Somebody might figure out that the Congress holds the purse strings and can increase the size and funding for our military at the stroke of a pen. We have spinach farmers, peanut farmers and labor unions who can put that money to much better use supporting Democrat candidates as long as we don’t let the cat out of the bag.

Instead, the burden of proof should be on those who have offered years of bravado and false optimism. Why are Americans supposed to believe Bush's current claims? Why shouldn't Congress continue to pressure the president to bring our combat troops home on a reasonable schedule? And why doesn't the president start talking seriously to Congress instead of just shouting at Democrats?
I like how you do that EJ. Nothing that Bush says about the facts can be believed. We get to take Dems at their word now. Hmmm, what about Petraeus though. He may be a problem. You may want to attack his veracity a little more in advance of his September report. But there’s time for that I guess. And I love the way your euphanism for retreat by the way – “bring the troops home on a reasonable schedule.” That has a great ring to it.


You can read EJ Dionne's dribble here. If this is what we can expect from the Dem's in light of what will most likely be increasingly good news from Iraq, there is a hole there the size of the Grand Canyon to be exploited. Only gross imcompetence in communicating it too the public could possibly fail this one. So why am I still worried?

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The Incalculable Cost of Surrender

Retired Marine Corps LTC Oliver North has authored the first article I have seen addressing in detail the likely ramifications of a withdrawal of our forces from Iraq.

. . . What would losing the war in Iraq mean? It's a picture so dark and depressing that it makes the collapse in Vietnam, 32 years ago next week, look like a Sunday school picnic. The fall of Saigon was horrific for the people of Vietnam and their neighbors in Cambodia and Laos. More than 5 million became refugees and by the most conservative estimates at least a million others perished.

For most Americans, the consequences were minimal. The vast majority of the 2.8 million of us who had fought and bled there mourned the loss of 58,253 of our comrades, swallowed the bitterness of defeat and got on with our lives. Our nation spent a few hundred million tax dollars on refugee relief and resettlement, and tried to forget what people in Reid's party called "the long nightmare of Vietnam."

But classified U.S. intelligence assessments, military contingency plans and staff studies evaluating the consequences of a precipitous U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, coupled with the lack of funding for political reform measures, as contained in the legislation just passed by Reid's party, paint a far more dismal picture than anything that happened after Vietnam.

-- Within months, an immediate upsurge in vicious sectarian violence fomented by Iranian intervention on behalf of Shiite militias and Wahabbi-supported, Al Qaeda-affiliated terror groups. As U.S. forces retreat to a half-dozen staging areas for retrograde through Kuwait and Jordan, American casualties will dramatically increase as suicide bombers seek "martyrdom" in their victory.

-- Inside of 18 months, the fragile democratically elected government in Baghdad will collapse, precipitating a real sectarian civil war and the creation of Taliban-like "regional governments" that will impose brutal, misogynistic rule throughout the country. The ensuing flood of refuges into Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Turkey and Iran will overwhelm relief organizations, creating a humanitarian disaster making what's happening in Darfur pale by comparison.

-- The Kurds in northern Iraq are likely to declare an autonomous region that could well result in Turkish, Iranian and even Syrian military intervention.

-- In the course of withdrawing U.S. combat brigades and support units, billions of dollars in American military equipment and ordnance will have to be destroyed or left behind. More than $40 billion in reconstruction projects for schools, health-care facilities, sanitation, clean water, electrical distribution and agricultural development will be abandoned. Plans to exploit the new West Qurna oil field in southeastern Iraq will be forsaken.

-- The governments of Kuwait, Jordan, Abu Dhabi and Bahrain, intimidated by Iranian boldness in acquiring nuclear weapons, will likely insist on the withdrawal of American military bases from their territories. Such a move will jeopardize U.S. naval operations in the Persian Gulf and logistics, intelligence collection and command and control facilities supporting operations in Afghanistan.

-- As Iraq becomes a battleground for the centuries-long Sunni-Shia conflict, radical Islamic terror organizations will use the territories they control to prepare and launch increasingly deadly terror attacks around the globe against U.S. citizens, businesses and interests.

Reid and his cohorts in Congress who believe "this war is lost" have acted to ensure that it will be. No one asked them: "If we lost, who won?" The answer should be obvious.
The last question should have included "and at what cost to us in the future?" Read the entire article here.

I think that LTC North misses only a few of the ramifications. Al Qaeda grew strong in the 1990's on the basis of their claim to defeating one of the world's super-powers, the Soviet Union, in Afghanistan. If al Qaeda is able to claim such a victory in Iraq - and they will do so and be believed if America retreats before Iraq is stabilized - the radicalization of Islam and new adherents to al Qaeda's philosophy will jump off the charts. It will also be taken as an affirmation of al Qaeda tactics - the extreme violence against the softest targets.

Iran's theocrats will likewise have their vision of Allah's will and the weakness of the West reaffirmed. Will there be any chance of stopping them from attaining nuclear weapons if we withdraw from Iraq? And as they attain a nuclear arsenal, the threat of atomic attacks in the west go up exponentially.

The threat radical Islam will pose to the West post-Iraq retreat dwarfs the threat we faced on 9-10.

The ramifications of leaving Iraq under the plan now passed by the Democrats has gotten no play. But it is of course the central question for our national security over the next half century, if not longer.

The Democrats plan for retreat, if enacted, will effect the ability of any future American President to commit the military overseas in the defense of American interests. He or she will have in the back of their mind that even if force is approved by Congress, that is meaningless for the war effort and any bold act involving ground troops may well be political suicide.

Further, I suspect our foreign policy will be greatly diminished. Who will ally with us in the future against extremists of whatever stripe if we cannot be counted on to finish what we have started? Two, our threats of force will be of no effect. And because of that, it will mean vastly greater bloodshed in the future when our honest threats go unheeded and we are required to act. Please do not forget that it was Sadaam's view of the U.S. as a "paper tiger" based on Vietnam that tipped his calculus in deciding to invade Kuwait.

All of this should be the sole focus of the debate on the Iraq war? Yet to date there has been nary a peep.

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Harry Reid an "Exhibition of Ineptitude"

Seems that at least one left of center commentator is not willing to defend the Surrender in Chief. This today from David Broder.

Here's a Washington political riddle where you fill in the blanks: As Alberto Gonzales is to the Republicans, Blank Blank is to the Democrats -- a continuing embarrassment thanks to his amateurish performance.

If you answered " Harry Reid," give yourself an A. And join the long list of senators of both parties who are ready for these two springtime exhibitions of ineptitude to end.

. . . [C]onsider the mental gyrations performed by Sen. Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.) as he rationalized the recent comment from his majority leader, Harry Reid, the leading light of Searchlight, Nev., that the war in Iraq "is lost."

On "Fox News Sunday," Schumer offered this clarification of Reid's off-the-cuff comment. "What Harry Reid is saying is that this war is lost -- in other words, a war where we mainly spend our time policing a civil war between Shiites and Sunnis. We are not going to solve that problem. . . . The war is not lost. And Harry Reid believes this -- we Democrats believe it. . . . So the bottom line is if the war continues on this path, if we continue to try to police and settle a civil war that's been going on for hundreds of years in Iraq, we can't win. But on the other hand, if we change the mission and have that mission focus on the more narrow goal of counterterrorism, we sure can win."

Everyone got that? This war is lost. But the war can be won. Not since Bill Clinton famously pondered the meaning of the word "is" has a Democratic leader confused things as much as Harry Reid did with his inept discussion of the alternatives in Iraq.

. . . But Reid's verbal wanderings on the war in Iraq are consequential -- not just for his party and the Senate but for the more important question of what happens to U.S. policy in that violent country and to the men and women whose lives are at stake.

. . . Instead of reinforcing the important proposition -- defined by the Iraq Study Group-- that a military strategy for Iraq is necessary but not sufficient to solve the myriad political problems of that country, Reid has mistakenly argued that the military effort is lost but a diplomatic-political strategy can still succeed.

The Democrats deserve better, and the country needs more, than Harry Reid has offered as Senate majority leader.
Read the entire article here.

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Taheri asks Reid, To Whom Will You Surrender?

Amir Taheri has a cutting essay today on Harry Reid and his impact on the war debate.

Without meaning to do so, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid has pushed the debate on Iraq in a new direction. Reid claims that the war is lost and that the United States has already been defeated. By advancing the claim, Reid has moved the debate away from the initial antiwar obsession with the legal and diplomatic controversies that preceded it.

At the same time, Reid has parted ways with Democratic leaders such as Sen. Hillary Clinton, who supported the war but who now claims that its conduct has been disastrous. What they mean, by implication, is that a Democratic president would do better than George W. Bush and win the war. Reid's new position, however, means that even a Democratic president wouldn't be able to ensure a U.S. victory in Iraq. For him, Iraq is irretrievably lost.

Some antiwar analysts have praised Reid for what they term "his clarity of perception." A closer examination, however, would show that Reid might have added to the confusion that has plagued his party over the issue from the start.

Because all wars have winners and losers, Reid, having identified America as the loser, is required to name the winner. This Reid cannot do.

The reason is that, whichever way one looks at the situation, America and its Iraqi allies remain the only objective victors in this war.

Reid cannot name al Qaeda as the winner, because the terror organization has failed to achieve any of its objectives. It hasn't been able to halt the process of democratization, marked by a string of elections, and it has failed to destroy the still fragile institutions created in the post-Saddam era. Al Qaeda is also suffering from increasing failure to attract new recruits, while coming under pressure from Iraqi Sunni Arab tribes, especially west of the Euphrates.

. . . What about the remnants of the Saddamite regime? Can Reid name them as victors? Hardly. . . .

Reid may believe that Iran, either alone or with its Syrian Sancho Panza, is the victor. If that's the case, Reid shares the illusion peddled by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Convinced that the Americans will run away, mostly thanks to political maneuvers by Reid and his friends, Ahmadinejad has gone on the offensive in Iraq and throughout the region. By heightening his profile, he wants to make sure that Iran reaps the fruits of what Reid is sowing in Washington.

But even then, it's unlikely that most Iraqis would acknowledge Ahmadinejad as winner and bow to his diktat. The Islamic Republic cannot act as victor solely because Reid says so.

It's possible that Reid imagined that his analytical problems are over simply because he has identified the war's loser. The truth is that his troubles are only beginning. He must tell Americans to whom they wish their army to surrender in Iraq.

That Reid is desperately trying to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory isn't surprising. His party requires an American defeat in Iraq in order to win the congressional and presidential elections next year. . . .
Read the whole article here. Even as events are advancing for the better in Iraq, fully 55% of Americans polled by the WSJ now believe that victory is not possible in Iraq. It is incredibly disheartening. What happens between now and September is crucial. American's had every right to demand much more from our government. By any measure, the Bush administration followed a magnificent military campaign with fumbling to a degree usually only seen in a Three Stooges short. But the Iraq of today is a far different animal then it was on election day last year, and I question just how many Americans want to embrace defeat in Iraq, with all the ramifications thereof, just to punish Bush or to reward the far left.

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Thursday, April 26, 2007

General Petraeus's Briefing on the Status of Operations In Iraq

The video below is of General Petraeus's April 26, 2007 news conference from the Pentagon on the status of the surge and Iranian involvement in violence in Iraq:



The audio tends to be a bit low, so here also is the complete transcript:

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well good morning. It's good to be with you all, and nice to see some familiar faces here this morning. My purpose this morning is to provide a short update on the situation in Iraq, including a brief description of the operational environment, the challenges Iraq faces, and the status of our operations, and then to take your questions. This is similar to my briefings to the House and Senate yesterday afternoon, but without the classified information that I provided to them, obviously.

The operational environment in Iraq is the most complex and challenging I have ever seen -- much more complex than it was when I left last in September 2005, and vastly more complex than what I recall in Central America, Haiti and the Balkans in previous tours in those locations.

The increase in sectarian violence in 2006 following the Samarra Mosque bombing did enormous damage, literally tearing the fabric of Iraqi society, changing the demographics of Baghdad neighborhoods, and displacing millions of Iraqis.

Today, members of al Qaeda, extremist militias and Sunni insurgent groups seek to destroy what Iraqi leaders are trying to build. Political parties with ethnosectarian interests, limited governmental capacity, and corruption add additional challenges, and exceedingly unhelpful activities by Iran and Syria, especially those by Iran, about which we have learned a great deal in the past month, compound the enormous problems facing the new Iraq.

The situation is, in short, exceedingly challenging, though as I will briefly explain, there has been progress in several areas in recent months despite the sensational attacks by al Qaeda, which have, of course, been significant blows to our effort and which cause psychological damage that is typically even greater than their physical damage.

Iraq is, in fact, the central front of al Qaeda's global campaign and we devote considerable resources to the fight against al Qaeda Iraq.

We have achieved some notable successes in the past two months, killing the security emir of eastern Anbar province, detaining a number of key network leaders, discovering how various elements of al Qaeda Iraq operate, taking apart a car bomb network that had killed 650 citizens of Baghdad, and destroying several significant car bomb factories. Nonetheless, al Qaeda Iraq remains a formidable foe with considerable resilience and a capability to produce horrific attacks, but a group whose ideology and methods have increasingly alienated many in Iraq.

This group's activities must be significantly disrupted, at the least, for the new Iraq to succeed, and it has been heartening to see Sunni Arabs in Anbar province and several other areas turning against al Qaeda and joining the Iraqi security forces to fight against it. That has been a very significant development.

The extremist militias in Iraq also are a substantial problem and must be significantly disrupted. There can be no sustainable outcome if militia death squads are allowed to lie low during the surge only to resurface later and resume killing and intimidation.

There have been some significant successes in this arena as well, including the detentions -- detention of the heads of the Sadr secret cell network, the Iraqi leader of an explosively formed projectile network from Iran, the former deputy minister of Health and his facility protection security force brigadier, who had effectively hijacked the Ministry of Health, and a national police officer accused of torture, with several of these detained by Iraqi forces.

Sunni insurgents and the so-called Sunni resistance are still forces that must be reckoned with, as well. However, while we continue to battle a number of such groups, we are seeing some others joining Sunni Arab tribes in turning against al Qaeda Iraq and helping transform Anbar province and other areas from being assessed as lost as little as six months ago to being relatively heartening. We will continue to engage with Sunni tribal sheikhs and former insurgent leaders to support the newfound opposition of some to al Qaeda, ensuring that their fighters join legitimate Iraqi security force elements to become part of the fight against extremists, just as we reach out to moderate members of all sects and ethnic groups to try to drive a wedge between the irreconcilables and the reconcilables, and help the latter become part of the solution instead of part of the problem.

There are also a number of challenges in the area of governance that the embassy and Multinational Force Iraq are helping the Iraqis to address. It is in fact important to recall that the government of Prime Minister Maliki is Iraq's fourth government in as many years. Moreover, it is not a government of national unity. Rather, it is one comprised of political leaders from different parties that often default to narrow agendas and a zero-sum approach to legislation.

That is one reason that progress on key laws has been slow, though there has been some progress. The budget law, the base hydrocarbon law approved by the Council of Ministers, the emergency powers law and so forth have all been noteworthy. And it is in fact just noteworthy to acknowledge, as Ambassador Negroponte did yesterday, just what Iraq has achieved since he served there as the ambassador in 2004, with respect to its elections, its constitution, its government and so forth. I believe Prime Minister Maliki and many other Iraqi leaders are committed to achieving more in this area in the months ahead.

Though its institutions are slowly developing, Iraq still suffers from a lack of the governmental capacity needed to put Iraq's oil revenues to work sufficiently for all its people. In view of this, we are working hard, together with the U.S. embassy again, to help strengthen institutions, doubling the number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams, establishing a law and order task force, developing an energy fusion cell, and increasing emphasis on ministerial mentorship.

The focus of Multinational Force Iraq is, of course, on working with our Iraqi counterparts to help improve security for the people of Iraq in order to give Iraqi leaders the time and space they need to come to grips with the tough political issues that must be resolved. Resolution of these issues is the key to the achievement of reconciliation among the various ethnic and sectarian groups, political parties and leaders in order to achieve a lasting solution to Iraq's problems.

We are still in the relatively early stages of our new effort, about two months into it, with three of five Army surge brigades and two additional Marine battalions on the ground, and the remainder of the additional combat forces scheduled to be operating in their areas by mid-June.

Baghdad is the main effort, and we continue to establish joint security stations and combat outposts in the city and in the belts around it. The presence of coalition and Iraqi forces and increased operational tempo, especially in areas where until recently we had no sustained presence, have begun to produce results. Most significantly, Iraqi and coalition forces have helped to bring about a substantial reduction in the rate of sectarian murders each month from January until now in Baghdad, a reduction of about two-thirds. There have also been increases in weapons caches seized and the number of actionable tips received.

In the Ramadi area, for example, U.S. and Iraqi forces have found nearly as many caches in the first four months of this year as they found in all of last year.

Beyond this, we are seeing a revival of markets, renewed commerce, the return of some displaced families and the slow resumption of services, though I want to be very clear that there is vastly more work to be done across the board and in many areas, and I again note that we are really just getting started with the new effort.

I am well aware that the sense of gradual progress and achievement we feel on the ground in many areas in Iraq is often eclipsed by the sensational attacks that overshadow our daily accomplishments. While the enemy's effectiveness in carrying out such attacks has been reduced by our operations to some degree, there clearly are still far too many of them, and we obviously are focusing heavily on actions to identify and dismantle the networks that carry out car bomb and suicide vest attacks and their supporting infrastructure.

Our achievements have not come without sacrifice. Our increase in operational tempo, location of our forces in the populations they are securing and conduct of operations in areas where we previously had no presence, as well as the enemy's greater use of certain types of explosive devices, have led to an increase in our losses. Our Iraqi partners have sacrificed heavily as well, with losses generally two to three times ours or even more.

Indeed, while some Iraqi forces remain a work in progress, there should be no question that Iraq's soldiers and police are fighting and dying for their country, and a number of them have impressively shouldered their part of the burden of the fight against al Qaeda and the other enemies of the new Iraq. To help them progress, we have steadily been increasing the number of transition teams, the train and equip effort, and steadily strengthening the partnership programs between our forces and Iraqi elements.

The situation in Iraq is, in sum, exceedingly complex and very tough. Success will take continued commitment, perseverance and sacrifice, all to make possible an opportunity for the all-important Iraqi political actions that are the key to long-term solutions to Iraq's many problems. Because we are operating in new areas and challenging elements in those areas, this effort may get harder before it gets easier.

Success, in the end, will depend on Iraqi actions. As I noted during my confirmation hearing, military action is necessary but not sufficient. We can provide the Iraqis an opportunity, but they will have to exploit it.

During Secretary Gates' recent visit to Iraq, we agreed that in early September, Ambassador Ryan Crocker and I would provide an assessment of the situation in Iraq with respect to our mission and offer recommendations on the way ahead. We will be forthright in that assessment, as I believe I have been with you today.

Finally, I'd like to take this opportunity to thank all Americans for their support of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and civilians serving in Iraq. Our young men and women in uniform deserve the recognition that Tom Brokaw accorded them when he described them as America's "new greatest generation." It's a privilege to serve with them again.

Thank you. And I look forward to your questions.

Q You say that Iraq is now the central focus of al Qaeda's worldwide effort. Are you saying that al Qaeda in Iraq is now the sort of principal enemy of the U.S. forces stationed there? Before it was Shi'a groups. And do you see that al Qaeda in Iraq -- do you see any evidence that it is linked internationally to bin Laden? How many foreign fighters are actually there?

GEN. PETRAEUS: First of all, we do definitely see links to the greater al Qaeda network. I think you know that we have at various times intercepted messages to and from. There is no question but that there is a network that supports the movement of foreign fighters through Syria into Iraq.

It is something we can, you know, keep some track of in a broad way. Obviously, when we can get the final 50 meters, if you will, we then take action against it.

It is clearly the element in Iraq that conducts the sensational attacks, these attacks that, as I mentioned, cause not just horrific physical damage -- and which, by the way, have been increasingly indiscriminate. Secretary Gates noted the other day that al Qaeda has declared war on all Iraqis, and I think that that is an accurate statement. They have killed and wounded and maimed countless Iraqi civilians in addition to, certainly, coalition and Iraqi security forces, and they have done that, again, without regard to ethnosectarian identity.

That significance of al Qaeda in the conduct of the sensational attacks, the huge car bomb attacks against which we have been hardening markets, hardening neighborhoods, trying to limit movement and so forth -- those attacks, again, are of extraordinary significance because they can literally drown out anything else that might be happening.

As I mentioned, we generally in many areas -- not all, but in many areas -- have a sense of sort of incremental progress. Again, that is not transmitted at all. Of course it will never break through the noise and the understandable coverage given to it in the press of a sensational attack that kills many Iraqis.

So this is a -- you know, it is a very significant enemy. I think it is probably public enemy number one. It is the enemy whose actions sparked the enormous increase in sectarian violence that did so much damage to Iraq in 2006, the bombing of the Al Askari mosque in Samarra, the gold-domed mosque there, the third holiest Shi'a shrine. And it is the organization that continues to try to reignite not just sectarian violence but ethnic violence, as well, going after Iraqi Kurds in Nineveh province and Kirkuk and areas such as that, as well. So again, I think a very, very significant enemy in that regard.

Q Number of foreign fighters?

GEN. PETRAEUS: I wouldn't hazard I guess. What I will say is that there are certainly dozens of foreign fighters who do come into the country on a monthly basis; again, sometimes more, sometimes less, depending on the state of the network.

It is obviously a network that we do focus on and try to disrupt very considerably.

Michael.

Q (Off mike.) What would be the -- in your assessment as a military man, what would be the consequences on the ground in Baghdad if the United States was to pull back from its security mission in the capital by the fall, withdraw its forces, say, to the forward- operating bases in the capital and maybe withdraw from Iraq by the summer of '08? I'm not asking you about congressional legislation, about timelines. I'm asking you for your military assessment of the effects on the ground if the U.S. were to end its security mission in Baghdad in the fall, in terms of insurgent activity, the vulnerability of the population and sectarian violence.

GEN. PETRAEUS: I have, as you know, in fact tried to stay clear of the political minefields of various legislative proposals and so forth. And I think, you know, the commander on the ground's job is to understand the mission he's given, make the request for the forces that are needed to accomplish that mission and then identify the risks, if you will, when all those forces may not be provided those resources. We are doing what we're doing, increasing our forces, in response to an increase in sectarian violence that took place in the year 2006. And it continued into January, when in fact sectarian murders were still very, very high in Baghdad. And that doesn't imply that they are at an acceptable level now, but they are about one-third what they were, say, as recently as January.

We believe that the presence of our forces and Iraqi forces in neighborhoods, the focus on the so-called extrajudicial killing, EJK, cells is at least in substantial part a reason for the reduction in these sectarian killings. So I think it's -- depending on where we are in September, of course, and I think that's a key question: How much progress can we make? My sense is that there would be an increase in sectarian violence, a resumption of sectarian violence, were the presence of our forces and Iraqi forces at that time to be reduced and not to be doing what it is that they are doing right now.

And I think again that carries through. In each case you have to make some assumptions about where you think you might be at that time. You could have some optimistic assumptions; you could have some pessimistic assumptions. And then that would determine, I think, what the result would be in terms of the resumption of insurgent activity, extremist activity in terms of the various death squads.

By the way, I'm not talking about the run-of-the-mill Jaish al- Mahdi, by the way. I'd like to distinguish between just sort of the young men with guns on the streets at various points in time and these extremist cells, which are the ones that cannot exist as they did in the past if Iraq is to have a sustainable situation at some point in time down the road.

Right here.

Q General, Lolita Baldor with AP. You said just now that things are likely to get -- may get worse before they get better. What kind of progress are you seeing or do you expect to see over the next couple of months that you think you'll be able to make this assessment in September? And if the Iraqi government does leave for a recess, which the secretary has asked them not to, will that postpone or impair your ability to make this assessment in September or just stall any improvements there?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well, we're going to make the assessment in early September. That's a commitment that Ambassador Crocker and I have made. By the way, we are determined to continue to operate as Ambassador Khalilzad and General Casey did -- one team, one mission -- and to carry on the embassy and Multinational Force Iraq literally linked arms as we do that.

But we have committed to make that assessment in September. We think that's the appropriate time to make it. It will be a time at which we will have had our additional forces on the ground for several months, all of them operating in the areas in which we intend to deploy them. We will have seen additional Iraqi security forces -- I forget the exact number that is being trained just in the month of May that will graduate from this greatly expanded institutional training capacity of the Iraqis. I think it's in the order of 7,000 to 9,000 in the military alone. But we can get that to you later. So they will have been, you know, beefed up continually during this time. There's additional equipment continually flowing to them. I note, by the way, they have well over 2,500 up-armored humvees alone now, a mech division, a wheeled armored vehicle brigade, and so forth.

So again, all of this will have gone on. And then on the Iraqi governmental side, they will have had a number of additional days -- meetings of the Council of Representatives. Our additional Provincial Reconstruction Teams will have been at work, the budget execution focus, the Rule of Law Task Force, and so forth.

We'll have seen whether in fact our efforts in these areas have helped produce the kind of progress that they're designed in fact to produce and to see if there is an exploitation of the opportunity that we believe our soldiers and Iraqi soldiers and police will have provided to the Iraqi governmental leaders to come to grips, again, with some of these really tough legislative issues.

Secretary Gates made pretty clear, I think, about the expectations that -- you know, that -- given the hard work of our soldiers and the Iraqi soldiers, that one would certainly hope that the Iraqi legislators would match that with their own hard work. That's our expectation. They want their country to succeed, needless to say, and it's going to require them obviously coming together to make the kind of progress that we think is important.

Yes, Tom.

Q You talk about continued commitment and perseverance and sacrifice, and you also say, as we've heard for years now, success will depend on the Iraqis. And I'm just wondering, do you anticipate high levels of troops -- American troops in Iraq -- let's say, 100,000 or thereabouts -- for years to come?

GEN. PETRAEUS: I'm not -- I wouldn't try to truly -- to anticipate what levels would be some years down the road. I think that my predecessor at various times -- a number of people have noted the length of commitment that has been required, and historical cases are somewhat similar to this, although every case is absolutely unique, and the challenges here, as I mentioned, are enormous, with huge regional implications as well.

It is an endeavor, again, that clearly is going to require enormous commitment and commitment over time. But beyond that, Tom, I don't want to get in to try to postulate how many brigades or when we would start to do something like that, so --

Q (Off mike) -- U.S. troops?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Oh, I wouldn't even -- I'm not going to hazard that kind of thing, so -- hi, Barbara.

Q Hi. The car bombs that you talked about, the spectacular attacks -- number one, do you have any way to tell us how much they have increased, perhaps, since the first of the year? Do you have any evidence of Iranian involvement at this point in any of these networks that are doing these massive car bombs?

And you spoke about Iran being extremely unhelpful. You said you had new information in the last month. What you have learned about Iran's involvement?

GEN. PETRAEUS: The Iranian involvement has really become much clearer to us and brought into much more focus during the interrogation of the members -- the heads of the Qazali network and some of the key members of that network that have been in detention now for a month or more.

This is the head of the secret cell network, the extremist secret cells. They were provided substantial funding, training on Iranian soil, advanced explosive munitions and technologies as well as run of the mill arms and ammunition, in some cases advice and in some cases even a degree of direction.

When we captured these individuals -- the initial capture, and then there have been a number of others since then -- we discovered, for example, a 22-page memorandum on a computer that detailed the planning, preparation, approval process and conduct of the operation that resulted in five of our soldiers being killed in Karbala.

It also detailed -- there are numerous documents which detailed a number of different attacks on coalition forces, and our sense is that these records were kept so that they could be handed in to whoever it is that is financing them. And there's no question, again, that Iranian financing is taking place through the Quds force of the Iranian Republican Guards Corps.

As you know, there are seven Quds Force members in detention as well. This involvement, again, we learned more about with the detention of an individual named Sheibani, who is one of the heads of the Sheibani network, which brings explosively formed projectiles into Iraq from Iran. His brother is the Iranian connection. He is -- was in Iraq. And that has been the conduit that then distributes these among the extremist elements again of these secret cells and so forth.

Those munitions, as you know, have been particularly lethal against some of our armored vehicles and responsible for some of the casualties, the more tragic casualties in attacks on our vehicles.

So I think that's what has taken place.

Sure.

Q May I formally ask you: What is your assessment at this point? Do you believe that the central government of Iran, Ahmadinejad himself, perhaps, is, number one, aware of this, supporting it, directing it? What is the central government involvement? Could this level of activity possibly take place without the Iranian leadership knowing about it?

And just as another point, do you see any involvement beyond EFPs? Are they now involved in these spectacular suicide car-bomb attacks?

GEN. PETRAEUS: I don't think we have found a link to the spectacular car-bomb attacks, which we believe are generally al Qaeda and elements sort of connected to al Qaeda. Typically, in fact, still we believe that, oh, 80 to 90 percent of the suicide attacks are carried out by foreigners. That's a network, again, that typically brings them in through Syria and is again a major concern and certainly a hope that Syria will crack down on the ability of people to come through their airport and so forth and then be brought into Iraq.

With respect to how high does it go and, you know, what do they know and when did they know it, I honestly cannot -- that is such a sensitive issue that -- and that we do not -- at least I do not know of anything that specifically identifies how high it goes beyond the level of the Qods Force, Commander Suleiman. Beyond that, it is very difficult to tell -- we know where he is in the overall chain of command; he certainly reports to the very top -- but again, nothing that would absolutely indicate, again, how high the knowledge of this actually goes. So --

Q General Petraeus, you said that things may get worse before they get better in this effort. Can you expand a little on what the American and Iraqi public should be potentially braced for?

And are higher U.S. casualties inevitable as a result of your new approach? You mentioned that your losses have gone up since you moved into the neighborhoods. Is that likely to continue? Is that something they should also be braced for?

GEN. PETRAEUS: I mentioned this because as you move into areas that you've not operated in before, as you contend with elements that were in those areas that in some cases were not challenged -- I mean, there are some element -- areas that were -- that had become, to some degree, sanctuaries for certain extremist organizations.

As that takes place, I think there is a very real possibility that there's going to be more combat action and that, therefore, there could be more casualties, and that's really all that I am implying with that. I don't want that to become the central message of this by any means.

But I think that when you are expanding your forces, when you're expanding your forces' presence, when you are going into areas that have been very lightly populated with coalition forces in the past, that there is going to be more action. And as we take on elements again that in some cases were unchallenged, that that will take place. And certainly Iraqi forces will be our partners in all of that and have been all along so far.

Q General, a clarification and then a question. In regards to this 22-page memorandum that you said was seized in one raid, was that in reference to the number of American soldiers who were sort of ambushed and kidnapped and then killed?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Yes.

Q And were you saying that there was evidence of Iranian involvement in that operation? I just want to be clear.

GEN. PETRAEUS: No. No. No. That -- first of all, that was the operation that you mentioned, and we do not have a direct link to Iranian involvement in that particular case.

Q And then, my question, regarding the fact that you said any success depends largely on the Iraqi government. Yet when what appears to be a key part of the early surge strategy is the erection of this -- what you called the concrete caterpillar, the 12-foot wall, that separates Sunni and Shi'a --

GEN. PETRAEUS: Yeah, this is not to separate Sunni and Shi'a.

Q Okay.

GEN. PETRAEUS: Let me use my point of personal privilege here to interject that. Let me just explain, in fact, if I could, and then I'll actually give you a chance to finish that question, Nick, if I could.

The concrete caterpillar, the Arizona creeper, whatever you want to call it, there really are a number of these throughout Baghdad. It is part of an overall effort that is designed to make neighborhoods, markets, areas of congestion safer for the Iraqis who live in those areas, work in them, shop in them and so forth.

I think I mentioned that it includes Operation Safe Neighborhood, Operation Safe Market.

Safe Market is one that -- where we focused first on the two biggest markets in Iraq -- the Shorja market and the Jadriya market. These have tens of thousands of Iraqis in them during their peak hours on a daily basis, and they were subject to car bombs before the Baghdad security plan began. And so with the Iraqis we sat down, and they designed a way of putting barriers around it so that you could limit access to it by vehicle. And they actually shut it off to vehicles during the hours that the market is in full swing, and they can only go in during the early-morning hours to set up and then after the market's closed to tear down and take out the trash and so forth. That's been done now for a vast number of markets, not just in Baghdad but in other cities as well.

There are similar efforts ongoing to enable better control of vehicular movement, checkpoints all over Baghdad. There's a proliferation of checkpoints. They've become increasingly elaborate to provide better through-put, better protection for the Iraqi soldiers who typically are the ones that are manning these.

Another effort: There is a Safe Neighborhood Initiative. Again, a number of different neighborhoods, and you can actually focus on where they need to be. You can look at the density, the plots if you will, of where there are sectarian murders taking place. And you array that for a week, for a month, what have you, and you can identify the areas in which there are cells operating.

And so when you're going to then go into that neighborhood, clear it, and clearing takes a long time. It's taking us 19 days just to clear Mansour district alone, for example, one of the central districts in Baghdad. You then have to be able to hold it, or else it is -- the clearing operation was not of enduring value. You can't hold it if you cannot control access to and from that particular neighborhood.

In most cases, actually, the neighbors welcome that kind of barrier plan or walls or what have you. And in many cases this has given the confidence to people in those neighborhoods to return to them, because now they are actually walled off from bad guys, from extremists, and that is what it is that we are trying to wall off. In some cases the walls are indeed along sectarian faultlines; in some cases they are just walling off neighborhoods that are mixed neighborhoods. Again, it depends on the geography of the neighborhood, not on the sectarian demographic breakdown.

The issue in this case, and the reason Adhamiya became a cause for concern is because it is a very old neighborhood, as many of you know who have been there, and it has one of the historic Sunni-Arab shrines in Iraq in it, a very old mosque. And that raised sensitivities that access to that was being walled off, and so forth. And so there was consideration given; our commanders with Iraqi commanders have looked hard, how can you achieve, again, population control without having some kind of obtrusive barrier, and so forth. And that is ongoing now.

So that's what it is that Iraqis and we are trying to do. By the way, a large number of the work is being done by Iraqis, Iraqi contractors and some Iraqi military engineer units, and then other is being done by U.S. engineer elements.

But go ahead --

Q Yet it also raised strong objections from Prime Minister Maliki. So how successful can U.S. military operations be if they are subject to being politically undercut by the Iraqi government?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well, I think it would be worth -- I think that that's probably worth seeking clarification on because there's been a little bit more of a meeting of minds I think on that in recent days.

Right here.

Q General, you talked about a Baghdad clock and a Washington clock. Can you explain what you mean by that? And is it your assessment that this war can be won on anything close to that Washington clock, and how would you envision -- what would that victory look like?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Yeah, sure. You know, what I've said is that there's a Washington clock ticking -- and actually, to be fair to those in Washington, it's an American clock. And -- but that clock is moving and it's moving at a rapid rate of speed, and it reflects the frustration, impatience, disappointment, anger, and a variety of other emotions -- feel about the pace in Iraq and the situation in Iraq. And, you know, I am not immune to those emotions either, having given over two and a half years of my life to it, and watched a number of our soldiers give the last full measure of devotion to it. So we want to see faster progress, and again, that is understandable that that clock is moving pretty rapidly.

The Baghdad clock, for all the reasons that I mentioned, is not moving as rapidly. It is not enough, for example, to go to Prime Minister Maliki, who I do believe, as I mentioned, is someone who wants to lead and serve all Iraqis, but it's not enough to go to him.

He's not the Prime Minister Tony Blair of Iraq. He does not have a parliamentary majority. He does not have his ministers in all of the different ministries. They are from all kinds of different parties. They sometimes sound a bit discordant in their statements to the press and their statements to other countries. It's a very, very challenging situation in which to lead.

And so, as I mentioned to some of the congressional leaders yesterday in fact, we need to encourage and provide that -- those emotions to all Iraqi leaders, the key leaders of the key parties of the key blocs of the Shi'a, Sunni, Kurds and so forth, and again, the key elements within those blocs and leaders in the Council of Representatives, leaders of the presidency, leaders of the -- again, that is what is necessary. And they're all going to have to work together to make progress.

That's a tall order, but that is what does have to happen. They understand it. I think that a number of them are determined to do what is necessary to achieve resolution of these very difficult issues, but again, I make no bones about the challenges that are involved there.

Q You've mentioned a number of positive trends, most notably the reduction in sectarian violence, but there are negative trends.

GEN. PETRAEUS: And I mentioned those too, I think. Yup.

Q Could you give us some numbers to go with those that are an equivalent with the numbers you've given us for the reduction in sectarian violence?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Okay. No, but, actually, I think the level of violence has roughly been -- depending again on how you calculate these things -- but by our consistent method, the level of violence has generally been unchanged. There was a dip for a while --

Q (Off mike) --

GEN. PETRAEUS: Throughout the country -- that there was a dip for a while. It was coming down and that these sensational attacks of the past couple of weeks, and a couple of these chlorine bomb attacks, just because of the sheer number of people that end up going to a hospital, even though they may then immediately come out, in the case of the chlorine bomb attacks, tends to run those up.

So we have not seen a corresponding drop in the level of violence statistics that we have seen in the sectarian murder statistics.

The reason I focused on the latter, though, is because it is a very important metric for neighborhoods. I mean, if your neighborhood is subject to the kind of extrajudicial killing that plagued Baghdad as recently as January and still does plague some neighborhoods, obviously you cannot focus on much other than just survival. And of course that's what caused this displacement of, really, millions of Iraqis over the course of the last couple of years. And it is something that again you have to drive down if again there's to be the degree of confidence that can help them gradually put a few stitches back into the fabric of a society that has been torn by sectarian violence.

Q What about car bombs? Can I ask you about car bombs?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well, that -- I factored that in there. I don't know that there's been an appreciable change, actually, in that. Again, it tends to be quite fluctuating. You know, the last couple of days, for example -- the previous two days after the horrific attack on our 82nd Airborne Division soldiers -- actually, it was backed down somewhat -- but again, it just tends to go in cycles, and we have not seen a definitive trend that I could report to you in that regard.

Yeah, right here.

Q Thanks. Sir, you said that success ultimately depends on the Iraqi government, and there's a reasonable chance that they won't come through with what they need to do, given all the complexities that you've laid out. What can you tell the American people? Why is it worth the continued sacrifice on the chance that the Iraqi government won't hold up this end of the bargain? And one of the things that I hear from people who are for the withdrawal or the phased redeployment is, how much worse can it get than it has been -- in 2006, 34,000 civilian dead?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well, I think again it does come down to the implications of various options. And it can get much, much worse than it was. Right now it is -- I think it's fair to say a good bit better, but again, I am not trying in any way, shape or form to indicate that this is a satisfactory situation whatsoever.

I did mention again one metric that I think is an important one, it's one that we happen to focus on literally with our forces. But there are others -- again, the car bombs, and I did in fact identify that as one that has shown an area in which we obviously have to focus even more effort, because it has inflicted horrific casualties on Iraqis in particular.

So again, I think you have to ask, you know, just as I responded to Michael Gordon's question, what are the implications of various options? What do you think would happen? Of course, that depends on some assumptions about the situation, when it is that you carry out the various options. And I think that that's hugely important as one, again, thinks of these different notions for the way ahead.

Yeah, in the back there.

Q

General, if sectarian killings are coming down, are you seeing any evidence of people moving back into their old districts and Sunnis and Shi'as starting to live together again?

And secondly, your recommendations in September, are you willing to countenance the idea that you may have to say to the president, this is not working, we should pull troops out, or are you more likely to say things are not going well, here are the adjustments and strategies we need to make?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well, on the latter one, I mean, I have an obligation to some wonderful young men and women in uniform, and a lot of civilians, by the way, who are serving in Iraq and who deserve a forthright assessment from the folks at the top about the situation on the ground, and that's what I'm going to provide.

Now, with respect to returnees, we're seeing small numbers, and that's, I think, what you heard me say in the statement. Again, I don't know that you would yet call it a trend. We have seen, again, some neighborhoods that were really depopulated, in which there have been the early signs of returns.

We have seen -- I mean, you look at a place, for example, like Dura, the Dura market down in East Rashid in Baghdad, a real difficult area, perhaps one of the toughest in all of Baghdad. I went on a couple of patrols the day after I took command back in February, and candidly, I was sort of shocked at what I saw in terms of what sectarian violence had done to Baghdad. And the Dura area in particular struck me because there was not a single shop open at all; and there now are -- I think it's over 200 and literally climbing every day.

The reason is because Iraqi and coalition soldiers hardened that market, located Iraqi and U.S. combat outposts right in the center of the market, and then on its periphery. And in fact, I walked through that area with a CNN reporter, in fact, a few weeks ago, and it has continued to expand over time down there despite attacks.

So there's a degree of resilience there as well.

But that's what we are seeing. And again, too soon, I think, to call that a trend, too soon to say that what we've done in just the first couple of months has -- with our Iraqi partners, again, enabled them to stitch together the fabric of society that was so torn.

Right here. Right.

Q General, the commander of Camp Cropper has been relieved and imprisoned for allegedly aiding the enemy. One, can you provide any more information about this? And two, to what do you attribute the apparent continuing problems with detainee operations?

GEN. PETRAEUS: He actually, I think, gave up command actually last fall, as I understand it. And I'm aware of his charges. But he is actually in Kuwait, which is where the case is being carried out. And as with any case that is ongoing, a senior commander can't comment because of the concern over command influence. And that's really where I'd have to leave that. I think that the command there has provided the details on the charges. Again, this is something that took place quite some time back, actually well before I came on the scene, and that's about all I know about that.

Q What can you say about --

GEN. PETRAEUS: With respect to the detainee operations, I think actually that we have learned an enormous amount the very hard way. I -- but I do think that we did make a number of corrections in the wake of Abu Ghraib and some of the other problems that we have had with detainee operations. We believe that those operations are quite humane. And obviously they're in somewhat marked contrast to those of al Qaeda and the extremists, who indiscriminately attack civilians and coalition and Iraqi security forces.

I saw the report by UNAMI, and we believe that there are numerous factual inaccuracies in that that actually need correct. And I'd actually welcome the opportunity to discuss this a little bit.

The administrative review process that MNF-I uses is really quite robust, and it has multiple checks and balances. The specific procedures that are followed by Multinational Force Iraq are based on those in the Fourth Geneva Convention, and they're well-rooted in generally accepted law of war principles, all of this supplemented and guided by the field manual that was published this past year, which governed the treatment of detainees, interrogation and so forth.

There is no 60-day period during which detainees are not allowed counsel, although normally there's a 30-day window before which visitors are allowed, although exceptions can be made in the case of an attorney.

After that, an individual can see his attorney. MNF-I maintains Detainee Assistance Center at its theater detention facilities, which again have come light years from where we were in the early days, but which, frankly, still need continued improvement, particularly in the sense that in some cases we have detainees who are truly maximum security type detainees, and we have to improve the facilities, in fact, to accommodate some of those individuals.

The Detainee Assistance Center facilities, the services are available to all detainees. We have the capability to refer a detainee to the Iraqi Bar Association, where he can obtain an attorney at the detainee's expense. Furthermore, the Iraqi government provides defense counsel to any detainee at no expense to the detainee at the time a detainee's case is referred to an investigative hearing at the Central Criminal Court of Iraq -- a process that, as you know, has been ongoing for some time. And additionally, a defense counsel will continue to be provided throughout all subsequent stages of that particular process.

Q General, last week -- you spoke about the progress in Anbar. Last week, Major General Olson, one of the leaders of the PRT efforts, raised a question about the Anbar effort, saying that the military has empowered tribal leaders potentially at the expense of democratic governance. I wonder if you think that's the case, and whether you would say at this point achieving stability and security and safety in Anbar has to be a greater priority than, you know -- than democratic governance.

GEN. PETRAEUS: Yeah, first of all, I didn't see that statement. I'd be somewhat surprised if it's -- is it the Rick Olson who's the PRT -- or who is --

Q Yeah. He was just saying that bringing the tribes in obviously had its good effects, but it also potentially undercuts the -- you know, what will hopefully be the elected government of Anbar province.

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well, look, I think first of all that the tribal elements of Iraq are a fact of life, and that what Iraq eventually will have is some form of government that at least listens to and incorporates the views of tribes and sheikhs, particularly in an area like Anbar province. Now, it varies when you're in cities; the tribal influence is less.

But I think that, candidly, a mistake that we may have made in early days was not to pay enough attention to these very important elements of Iraqi society, which still play a very, very key role and are really, you know, a lot more than I think sort of the stereotypical view of tribes. I mean, each tribe generally has a construction company, an import-export business, and a trucking company as well. I mean these are entrepreneurs as well as tribes, and they provide a variety of services to the members of their tribes.

So I think, again, that what results in Anbar province will actually have the features of democratic governance representing the citizens of Anbar province and being responsive to them.

But among those elements to whom they are responsive will be certainly the sheikhs and the leaders of the major tribes in that area, because of the allegiance that the people give to them.

Anbar province made the progress that it did because of the courageous action of some sheikhs who said, enough, to the killing by al Qaeda of their brothers, sons, sheikhs and so forth. It started with Sheikh Sattar near Ramadi, working with Colonel Sean MacFarland. He came to Colonel MacFarland and said, I'd like to join the coalition in fighting against al Qaeda, and they made a pretty courageous choice. He volunteered some of his young men to be part of the Iraqi police structure, and it literally just started to ripple on out from there, with each sort of contiguous tribe joining in the same fashion. And what you have now is a very, very significant movement.

By the way, that tribal movement is now turning into a political movement. And Sheikh Sattar had a meeting with a number of the tribal leaders just, I think it was, last week, where they came together to discuss when provincial elections are held, as the process moves forward in Anbar province, should this effort that has been focused largely on helping the security forces be moved forward also as somewhat of a political movement? And in fact, Prime Minister Maliki went out there, as I think you know, to Ramadi and met with not just the governor or the provincial council but also with the sheikhs and with the leaders of the Iraqi security forces.

Again, none of this would have been possible without these sheikhs, particularly the early ones, taking a very courageous stand at a time that was actually very, very dangerous, and has now enabled the Iraqi and coalition forces in partnership to largely clear Ramadi, which only two months or two-and-a-half months ago was largely al Qaeda central. And just to get to the governance center, you literally had to fight your way downtown.

Q Just to follow up, General, do you think the tribes are -- are they working with the U.S. military or are they working with the central Iraqi government? And if the U.S. was to reduce its presence in Anbar, would that -- would these gains erode, with the --

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well, again, we have been very careful to ensure that these individuals are incorporated in Iraqi security force formations. As you may know, just a few months back, six months certainly back, when the call went out for volunteers for the 7th Iraqi Army Division, a division from about Ramadi on out into Western Anbar, there were just -- I think it was less than the fingers on these two hands who volunteered that day. And then subsequent one, there were a few more. Well, most recently there were 2,000 young Anbari men who showed up to volunteer for that when they had a recruiting drive at Habbaniya, I think it was. So there has been an enormous shift.

By the way, I found the same enthusiasm in Western Nineveh province, an area that I knew from the first year there with the 101st Airborne Division, met with the sheikhs of the Shammar tribe up there.

And these are individuals who sadly in the period of the most intimidation by al Qaeda of Sunni Arabs in the fall of 2004 and well into 2005, the period when they boycotted the election and so forth, and really now know that they lost out -- we could not get volunteers from those particular tribes. Now they want to help form new battalions and so forth.

Now, this is not just because they want to fight against al Qaeda. It is also because of a very good and realistic appraisal of this situation, and that is that the Sunni Arabs lost out by not participating in the past. They lost influence in government. They lost influence, if you will, or participation, jobs in the Iraqi security forces, and I think they now recognize that they need to participate, they want to participate. And that is a very, very important development, again. And once again, this never could have -- the progress in Anbar would not have happened without that.

If you now trace down the Euphrates River Valley and start out at al Qaim and Husaybah and walk your way on in and Haditha, Hit, Ramadi, and then over towards the Fallujah area, you get all the way until past Ramadi. This is not to say al Qaeda's still not trying to blow up newly in-place police stations in Ramadi, they did it the other day; nor that they are taking any of this lying down.

In fact, the areas around Fallujah are still quite problematic and are areas where the new Marine battalions -- this is an example of an area that I talked about, where we had not had a sustained presence in the past, where we are now able to have a sustained presence because of our additional forces and because of the expansion of Iraqi security forces in Anbar province. And we're going to expand in some other areas in that area here in the months ahead as well.

So that's the dynamic that's going on, and I suspect in truth that Rick probably did not mean quite the way that you may have characterized that, Julian.

Thanks.

Yes?

Q Sir, could you elaborate a little bit more on the benchmarks you'll be reviewing in your September assessment that even Joe Six-pack or armchair generals could understand? Is it possible that the number of spectacular attacks could continue throughout the summer, and yet you still see progress -- effort to buy time for the Iraqi government?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Yeah, I -- this is something we've actually been working on a good bit, and in fact, we gave to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs yesterday a set of what we are sort of thinking about. Now I need to do more coordination.

Ryan Crocker and I are proceeding on this. We need to do some more ciphering on this and do some more thinking on it. But, you know, we provide an enormous wealth of detail right now that goes into the 9010 Report, the quarterly report that goes into weekly joint staff metrics and a whole variety of other submissions.

And with respect to that, we will probably focus on four areas: security, economics, politics/governance and rule of law.

In the security arena, you're looking at, you know, what is it that would show you that you have been able to achieve, to help the Iraqis achieve greater population security? What about the influence of militias and what about the progress of the Iraqi security forces?

When you look at the -- sort of the economic arena, again, we're looking for things that show that the Iraqis are into this big-time, which we believe they are, but also show that our approach is having the effect that we hope that it will have. But in the economic arena, how are they doing spending their money?

As you know, last year, the Iraqis did not spend some $10 (billion) to $12 billion of their budget for -- a year in which the International Monetary Fund was going to allow them to run a 5 percent deficit, which is common for countries that are sort of coming out of the situation in Iraq -- which Iraq finds itself. So this is very important, that they in fact spend the money that they have for all Iraqis, for the good of them.

And as you know, much of what is done for Iraqis, the whole social safety network, which is very substantial but which is torn and frayed in a variety of different locations where the security situation's been tough, this is all done through the ministries. And so they've got to spend their money. So we'll look at how are they doing in spending the budget, in particularly what about the capital investment account? They're good at spending salaries; the question is, are they buying the equipment, making the improvements, the construction and so forth.

What about banks? How are the banks doing? Are they reopening? And an interesting phenomenon, by the way -- there is now private banking in Iraq for the first time, I believe, ever, or at least certainly in a few decades. And I noted -- I just saw where there's private banks in Kirkuk. There's, believe it or not, a private bank, I think, in Ramadi or in someplace in Anbar province, maybe Haditha.

So again, how are they doing -- how are the provinces doing in receiving their money and, again, in spending it? Is the government doing all that it can for all provinces and all Iraqis?

Politics and governance -- obviously there we're talking about progress on key legislation. I've talked about that. You're looking at what about if there are some malign actors in some places in government? I mentioned that the deputy minister of Health was detained with the -- at the direction of the prime minister, I believe -- certainly his support, the head of the facility protection security forces -- that kind of activity, again, is what we're looking on there, and then just sort of the progress in the development of governmental capacity, ministry development.

And then in the rule of law, how is progress on the development of the criminal justice system, their detention facilities and system -- which is a big, big challenge and they have had big problems in that, as you know, in the past, particularly during the period when sectarian -- where certain Iraqi security force elements really were hijacked by sectarian militias as well. How is the Rule of Law Green Zone coming along and other initiatives, the circuit rider judicial effort and some of these things? So again, that's roughly what we're looking at.

As I mentioned, we just first gave a first draft pre-decisional think piece to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs yesterday. The Joint Staff and everybody else will work it. Ambassador Ryan Crocker and I need to do some more work on it as well, and then we will move it forward.

Q (Off mike) -- progress are less than obvious to a person in the United States, much less Iraq or Europe. Is it possible that these things could improve while spectacular bombing attacks still occur in parallel?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well, I think first of all -- look, I think you have to be realistic and acknowledge there is going to be a continuation of some level of sensational attacks. In an environment where to prevent those, you know, the Iraqi and coalition forces have to protect everything and they only have to attack one thing, some of that is going to happen. I used the analogy the other day of Northern Ireland, which some of you are very familiar with and in which for some decades there was a level of violence that actually the Northern Ireland citizens learned to live with, really.

And actually, to be fair to the Iraqis, I mean they're an exceedingly resilient people. I actually the other night was talking to one of your colleagues from The Washington Post and talked about this idea that there is -- you know, we feel this incremental progress; it's very difficult to demonstrate. In fact, the progress is interesting, because it's a negative. It means nothing happened, in most cases. In other words, there were not sectarian murders. Whether that is newsworthy before it goes on for several weeks is obviously arguable.

But anyway, so what I asked was, "Hey, come on, it's about dusk, let's go -- we'll fly around the city a little bit." And we flew around. And so -- I mean, it was unbelievable.

This is a day in which I think there was a car bomb in Iraq, some of Iraq’s seven million citizens were affected by that, but you could not have told that from what we saw over the city. There were three big amusement parks operational. I'm talking about, you know, roller coaster kinds of -- these are not just a couple little merry-go-rounds in small neighborhood parks. Restaurants in some parts of the city were booming. Lots of markets were open. The people were on the street. There were -- there had to be a thousand soccer games ongoing. They're watering the grass in various professional soccer fields -- the soccer leagues.

You know, all of this is actually so foreign, I think, in the mind of most people who see the news and of course do see that day's explosion or something like that. And actually there is a city of seven million in which life goes on, and again, citizens are determined to carry on with their life.

Just one more, please.

Q General, I'm sorry. I have to try one more time on the 22- page memo, because it seems like the first time you mentioned it, you said you found it in the computer of the cell that was dealing with Iran.

GEN. PETRAEUS: Right.

Q And I thought you said that they were saving it in order to demonstrate to their Iranian patrons that they --

GEN. PETRAEUS: That's our speculation. Now, what I --

Q (Off mike.)

GEN. PETRAEUS: No, what I said to Mik was, we did not -- we have not seen evidence of direct Iranian involvement in that case. If you said -- I mean, in other words, coaching them on how to do it, telling them to do it or what have you. Again, we don't --

Q Or bragging, then, reporting back about an operation --

GEN. PETRAEUS: Yeah. We think -- again, this is speculation, but I think it is fairly logical speculation. We think that records are kept so that the individuals that carry out these attacks can demonstrate what they're doing to those who are providing the resources to them, providing the additional funding, training, arms, ammunition, advanced technologies and so forth. So --

Q Not necessarily involvement in that specific operation? From the Iranians, I mean.

GEN. PETRAEUS: Again, not direction, not -- again, we just can't confirm it. I can't say it wasn't there either, but we did not find, if you will, a direct fingerprint to it.

Thank you all very much.

Q But there is a connection between that group and the Iranians?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Oh, there's no question that the Qazali network is directly connected to the Iranian Qods Force, received money, training, arms, ammunition, and at some points in time even advice and assistance and direction. So --

Q And they're the ones who carried out the Karbala attack?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Yes. That network's members did carry out that.

Thanks. Great to see you all again.

Q Thank you.

Q Thank you, General.

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Fred Thompson's Most Important Piece - Criticizing Radical Islam & US / UK Multiculturalism

Fred Thompson has crafted a seemingly innocuous op-ed piece, quoted below, taking to task the US and UK for not addressing the cultural problems of "peaceful" Islamists in their midst. Specifically, he criticizes teachers in the UK for not teaching historical truth out of fear for conflict with or offending Muslim children being fed propoganda at their Wahhabi / Salafi mosques. (If you question that last sentence, see Undercover Mosque). This essay will likely pass unnoticed by most. It should not.

The essay is actually stunning in its significance. Fred Thompson get's it. He, alone of all the candidates for President of any political party, has just demonstrated that he understands precisely what the conflict with radical Islam is all about, and he understands that the fight against it has to be at every level - including at the level of challenging the myths and dogma of the Islamists.

If you think this is a small issue, think again. The existential threats of radical Wahhabi / Salafi Islam and Khomeinist Shia'ism will never be stopped until their religion is challenged and evolves. Juxtapose against that the the billions that have been and are being spent by Saudi Arabia to make a home for - and of - their radical sect in the West. Consider the UN seeking to outlaw any criticism of Islam, the radicalization of secular or moderate Muslim countries (Somalia, Indonesia, Turkey and Pakistan among others), the Saudi funded effort backed by Democrats to change our laws to benefit radical Islamists. Consider the recent censorship by PBS of a documentary aimed at exposing the threat of radicals to moderates who seek to evolve their religion from Wahhab's medieval version. That act by PBS is just a minor example of how our government and MSM are actually enabling Wahhabism to flourish in the U.S. Whether to address the radical poison of Wahhabism at the most basic level is not a small issue - it is the crux of the issue. All else is treating the symptoms. And Fred Thompson has just taken a stand:

. . . [S]ome schools in Great Britain have stopped teaching history that is offensive to Muslim students. The topics that have been erased from the curriculum, the study found, include both the Nazi genocide and the Crusades.

This rewriting of history through omission wasn't some government policy. It was the result of individual decisions in local schools by teachers with large populations of Muslim students. Unfortunately, many of these students have been taught by parents and mosques that the holocaust never happened and that the Crusades were an unprovoked attack on Islam by European Christians. History books that present these events in any other light, they believe, are part some giant conspiracy designed to attack their very religion.

If anybody needs to hear these facts, it is the children who are being abused by those who are teaching the same hateful lies that have helped turn the Middle East into the self-destructive and often suicidal mess it is today.

. . . [T]here is a point when the desire not to offend the easily offended becomes an even bigger problem. We've already seen an English organization ban images of Piglet, the harmless character from the classic Winnie the Pooh books, because of protests by those who imagine that simply seeing a cartoon pig is a violation of their civil rights. We've even seen the banning of pins bearing St. George's cross, because it reminds some of the Crusades -- accompanied by demands that Great Britain get rid of the venerable Union Jack for the same reason.

These views, common in the Middle East, are not just an academic or intellectual challenge. We have seen homegrown British terrorists act on the same lies and conspiracy theories that are now being used to silence teachers. Ideas do have consequences and we all need to understand that the war on terror is taking place as much in the realm of ideas as it is on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan.

America is a free country and we do not tell people what they can believe or say. We should realize, however, that there are people in America who are also telling their children that the holocaust is a lie and that those who say otherwise are their enemies. We cannot prevent them from doing so, but we also cannot let them promote their agenda by claiming they are victimized by historical facts.

This would be a good place to quote an important British writer, George Orwell, who wrote, "Who controls the past controls the future. Who controls the present controls the past." Even in America, our children are often taught a watered down, inoffensive and culturally sensitive version of events ranging from the Crusades to the battle at the Alamo.

It's time for people who believe that they have a stake in Western civilization and its traditions to get a little backbone -- even if it offends somebody.
Read the entire article here. Fred Thompson just wrote an incredibly important article. I wonder how many people will take note.

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Democrats Devolving . . .



Thanks to Steve Halter for providing this.

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More Thoughts On The Democrats' Embrace of Defeat

Ed Morrisey at Captain's Quarters hits the nail on the head with his commentary this day:

. . . [T]he Bush administration understands the catastrophe in store for the region if the US yanks the troops from Iraq, while the Democrats have played this new strategy strictly for political gain. The same party leaders that scolded Bush during the election last year for listening to Donald Rumsfeld rather than his field commanders now won't even bother to attend a briefing with Petraeus before setting out on this course. They set the vote up in order to coordinate campaign commercials while declaring defeat from Capitol Hill. They have made themselves into a disgrace in less than four months in power, reminding the nation why they locked them out of power for the previous six years.
Read the entire post here.

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Joe Lieberman Responds to Harry Reid

Senator Joe Lieberman, eloquent as always, responds to Harry Reid's craven and opportunistic claims claims that the Iraq war is "lost" and the surge is "failed" because of al Qaeda suicide bombings in Baghdad.

Last week a series of coordinated suicide bombings killed more than 170 people. The victims were not soldiers or government officials but civilians -- innocent men, women and children indiscriminately murdered on their way home from work and school.

If such an atrocity had been perpetrated in the United States, Europe or Israel, our response would surely have been anger at the fanatics responsible and resolve not to surrender to their barbarism.

Unfortunately, because this slaughter took place in Baghdad, the carnage was seized upon as the latest talking point by advocates of withdrawal here in Washington. Rather than condemning the attacks and the terrorists who committed them, critics trumpeted them as proof that Gen. David Petraeus's security strategy has failed and that the war is "lost."

And today, perversely, the Senate is likely to vote on a binding timeline of withdrawal from Iraq.

This reaction is dangerously wrong. It reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of both the reality in Iraq and the nature of the enemy we are fighting there.

. . . In the two months since Petraeus took command, the United States and its Iraqi allies have made encouraging progress on two problems that once seemed intractable: tamping down the Shiite-led sectarian violence that paralyzed Baghdad until recently and consolidating support from Iraqi Sunnis -- particularly in Anbar, a province dismissed just a few months ago as hopelessly mired in insurgency.

This progress is real, but it is still preliminary.

The suicide bombings we see now in Iraq are an attempt to reverse these gains: a deliberate, calculated counteroffensive led foremost by al-Qaeda, the same network of Islamist extremists that perpetrated catastrophic attacks in Kenya, Indonesia, Turkey and, yes, New York and Washington.

Indeed, to the extent that last week's bloodshed clarified anything, it is that the battle of Baghdad is increasingly a battle against al-Qaeda. Whether we like it or not, al-Qaeda views the Iraqi capital as a central front of its war against us.

Al-Qaeda's strategy for victory in Iraq is clear. It is trying to kill as many innocent people as possible in the hope of reigniting Shiite sectarian violence and terrorizing the Sunnis into submission.

In other words, just as Petraeus and his troops are working to empower and unite Iraqi moderates by establishing basic security, al-Qaeda is trying to divide and conquer with spectacular acts of butchery.

That is why the suggestion that we can fight al-Qaeda but stay out of Iraq's "civil war" is specious, since the very crux of al-Qaeda's strategy in Iraq has been to try to provoke civil war.

. . . When politicians here declare that Iraq is "lost" in reaction to al-Qaeda's terrorist attacks and demand timetables for withdrawal, they are doing exactly what al-Qaeda hopes they will do, although I know that is not their intent.

Even as the American political center falters, the Iraqi political center is holding. In the aftermath of last week's attacks, there were no large-scale reprisals by Shiite militias -- as undoubtedly would have occurred last year. Despite the violence, Iraq's leadership continues to make slow but visible progress toward compromise and reconciliation.

But if tomorrow Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds were to achieve the "political solution" we all hope for, the threat of al-Qaeda in Iraq would not vanish.

Al-Qaeda, after all, isn't carrying out mass murder against civilians in the streets of Baghdad because it wants a more equitable distribution of oil revenue. Its aim in Iraq isn't to get a seat at the political table; it wants to blow up the table -- along with everyone seated at it.

Certainly al-Qaeda can be weakened by isolating it politically. But even after the overwhelming majority of Iraqis agree on a shared political vision, there will remain a hardened core of extremists who are dedicated to destroying that vision through horrific violence. These forces cannot be negotiated or reasoned out of existence. They must be defeated.

The challenge before us, then, is whether we respond to al-Qaeda's barbarism by running away, as it hopes we do -- abandoning the future of Iraq, the Middle East and ultimately our own security to the very people responsible for last week's atrocities -- or whether we stand and fight.

To me, there is only one choice that protects America's security -- and that is to stand, and fight, and win.
Read the entire article here. It is a very reasoned response. But I wonder if it is keeping Senator Lieberman awake at night knowing that he can put an end to this Democratic opportunism by merely moving his chair across the aisle? You know it has to be eating at him.

Update: Here is an article from Hugh Hewitt asking when Lieberman will join the Republicans. And here is Lieberman's floor speech. It is actually bettern then the article he authored.

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